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D ividing Lines, Impoverished Domains: 
The Aesthetic and the Artistic
This p ap e r is a prelim inary  investigation in to  the d istinction  betw een 
two concepts, the viability o f  the distinction, the precise way o f draw ing it, 
the m otivation b eh in d  it and  its general im plications. T he d istinction  I will 
be talking ab o u t is one drawn betw een the concep t of the aesthetic an d  tha t 
o f  the artistic and  is applicable to distinct kinds o f ju d g em en t, value and  
appreciation . T he distinction is widely acknow ledged an d  draw n in m any 
d ifferen t ways with d ifferen t purposes in m in d .1 T herefo re , w hen I re fer to 
the m otivation b eh in d  the distinction  I do  n o t m ean a w elcom e desire for 
conceptual clarity but, rather, m uch m ore specific motives: such as consid­
e ra tio n s  o f  p u rity  a t o n e  e n d  (th e  k in d  o f  ae s th e tic  p u rism  fo u n d  in  
B eardsley)2 a n d  the  n ee d  to do away with the  artw ork  in  favour o f  the
1 An overview of the different ways of drawing the distinction is given by Bohdan 
Dziemidok in his »On Aesthetic and Artistic Evaluations of the Work of Art« in Peter 
McCormick (ed. ) The Reasons of Art, Ottawa: Ottawa University Press 1985 and »On 
the Need to Distinguish Between Aesthetic and Artistic Evaluations of Art« in R. J. 
Yanal (ed. ) Institutions of Art: Reconsiderations of George Dickie’s Philosophy, Pennsylvania: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press 1994. See also his »Controversy About the 
Aesthetic Nature of Art« British Journal of Aesthetics 28 (1988) 1-17 and »Aesthetic 
Experience and Evaluation« in J. Fisher (ed. ) Essays on Aesthetics: Perspectives on the 
Work of M. C. Beardsley, Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1983.
With entirely different motivation, the distinction is made out by David Best who 
links the artistic with the »possibility of expression of a conception of life issues«. 
See »The Aesthetic and the Artistic, Philosophy 57 (1982) 351-372, reprinted as ch. 11 
in his Feeling and Reason in the Arts, London 1985, and »The Aesthetic and the Artistic«, 
chapter 12 in The Rationality of Feeling, London 1992. The same link is drawn by 
Graham McFee in »Art, Beauty and the Ethical« (unpublished paper given in Antwerp 
1996), whereas in »The Artistic and the Aesthetic«(unpublished paper given at the 
Annual Conference of the British Society of Aesthetics 1998), McFee firmly locates 
the aesthetic outside the domain of art arguing that »to attribute (merely) aesthetic 
properties to artworks is to misperceive them« [p. 2]. See also »Basic Concepts« in G. 
McFee Understanding Dance, London: Routledge 1992.
2 M. C. Beardsley, Aesthetics, Indianapolis: Hackett 1980. Also Alfred Lessing, »What is 
Wrong with a Forgery?« in Dennis Dutton (ed.) The Forger’s Art, Berkeley: University 
of California Press 1983 and R. Rudner »On Seeing What we Shall See« in R. Rudner 
and I. Scheffler (eds.) Logic and Art: Essays in Honour of Nelson Goodman, Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill 1972.
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readym ade at the o th e r extrem e (that occupied  by som e advocates o f  the 
in stitu tional theo ry )3.
My discussion is restric ted  in two ways: (a) by virtue o f being  prelim i­
nary  in the  sense th a t I focus on  what I take to be the »prehistory« o f  the 
d istinction , and  (b) by being  narrow  in scope. T he m ain p art o f  the p ap e r 
is th ere fo re  concerned  with Beardsley’s distinction betw een objective and  
genetic  ju d g em en ts  an d  its supporting  secondary distinctions. B eardsley’s 
distinction am ounts to a d ichotom y between the aesthetic as percep tual and  
to a narrow  concep tion  o f the artistic as genetic, re ferring  to the artist in 
the term s o f the doctrine o f the In tentional Fallacy. T he polarised, schem atic 
way in w hich the objective an d  the genetic  dom ain  are sep ara ted  in the 
co n tex t o f this approach  characterises also various subsequen t attem pts to 
separate  the aesthetic and  the artistic, in particu lar w hen the d istinction is 
invoked in  o rd e r to resolve the problem  o f forgeries, one o f the so-called 
»puzzles o f Aesdiedcs« whose form ulation relies precisely on the conception  
o f the aesthetic tha t is consequently  invoked in o rd e r to dispel the confu­
sion. T hus in the concluding  part o f my paper I will discuss briefly the p ro b ­
lem  o f forgeries in re la tion  to the distinction. In  a sense, the p ap er rem ains 
inconclusive, so to speak, simply because the m aterial I cover is highly se­
lective in  a biased way and  thus perhaps insufficient in o rd e r to su p p o rt the 
conclusion I w ould like to draw. This conclusion, which is implicitly p resen t 
th ro u g h o u t my discussion, am ounts to the expression o f extrem e skepticism 
with respect to the appropriateness o f the concep t o f the aesthetic in defin ­
ing the charac te r o f ou r appreciation  o f works o f art. This line o f  th o u g h t 
supports the idea o f ou r appreciation  o f works o f art seen as exactly this, i.e. 
a holistic, well-integrated response whose charac te r is art-historically, insti­
tutionally  defined. O n the o th e r hand , a conclusion th a t can be su p p o rted  
by my m aterial is that the sharp  delineation of the aesthetic dom ain effected 
u n d e r  the regim e o f considerations o f  purity leaves the aesthetic in a state 
o f  ex trem e im poverishm ent.
B eardsley’s concep tion  o f the aesthetic object as it appears in his 1958 
Aesthetics may sound  dated  today. However, the deba te  his theory  o f the aes­
thetic and  the re la ted  anti-intentionalism  stim ulated is still very m uch alive. 
M oreover, his later, refined, theory o f aesthetic experience and  the aesthetic 
d efin ition  o f art (involving the no tion  o f an  »aesthetic artwork« -  a m ajor 
concession to in tentionalism ) are still quite influential.
3 T. Binkley, »Piece: Contra Aesthetic« inj. Margolis (ed.) Philosophy Looks at the Arts, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1977. For a discussion of the institutional theory 
leading to the distinction as a way of resolving what are considered to be its difficulties, 
see Carolyn Korsmeyer, »On Distinguishing Between Aesthetic and Artistic«, The 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 11 (1977) 45-57.
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G oing back to Beardsley’s distinction betw een objective an d  genetic  
reasons (judgem ents), i.e. those tha t are genuinely  a ttrib u ted  to the  work 
itself and  those tha t re fer to the causes and  conditions o f th e  w ork an d  in­
clude n o t only psychological processes bu t also the physical processes tha t 
b ro u g h t the w ork in to  being, I am  n o t co n cern ed  with d iscard ing , quite 
redundantly , an  out-of-date distinction. Rather, I am  trying to h igh ligh t the 
surprising  (to m e, at least) fact tha t the term s in which this d istinction  is 
conceived survive to som e ex ten t in la ter a ttem pts to separate  the aesthetic 
an d  the artistic. T h a t is, a lthough  nobody w ould th ink  o f casting the artistic 
in Beardsley’s simplistic term s, it is still th o u g h t o f as som eth ing  ex terna l to 
the work and  it is often conceived in a schematic, polarised way. W hich brings 
m e to the second reason why I find it useful to look at Beardsley again, a 
reason  tha t has to do with distinction-draw ing strategies in general. For the 
objective/genetic distinction is supported  by a nu m b er o f o th e r distinctions, 
som e o f them  em ploying spatial m etaphors like the distinction betw een in­
ternal and  external characteristics o f the aesthetic object which in their tu rn  
define w hat lies inside and  w hat falls outside the dom ain o f the aesthetic. 
T here  is also the distinction betw een veridical and  illusory characteristics o f 
the  aesthetic  object, i.e. those th a t rely on  d irec t sensory aw areness (the 
aesthetic object is after all defined  as »a percep tual object«) as o pposed  to 
the latter th a t involve the »obscurity« o f  inference. My claim  with respect 
to all the above is tha t Beardsley is n o t able to m aintain  the distinctness o f 
the dichotom ies he  proposes an d  tha t this fact renders his ap p ro ach  inco­
heren t. To see why this is so requires (a) m aking a prelim inary  p o in t ab o u t 
translatability and  (b) going through  his list o f genetic and  objective reasons 
an d  s tructu ring  it som ew hat by organising som e o f them  in opposing  pairs.
First, translatability. Beardsley’s p ro ject o f objective criticism  is co rrec­
tive in  charac te r aim ing at reform ing  criticism  an d  shaking o ff even the  last 
traces o f  the in ten tional fallacy. In this contex t, he proposes a specific way 
o f co rrec ting  critical ju d g em en ts  by recasting them  in objective term s. This 
am ounts to the principle o f translatability o f genetic to objective judgem ents. 
But the m ere possibility o f translatability, involving as it would, the  transfer­
ence o f sem antic con ten t, unch an g ed  (i.e. w ithout any loss o f  m ean ing ), 
from  the dom ain  o f the genetic to th a t o f  the objective shows th a t the  con­
ceptual dichotom y between the two dom ains is n o t as rigid as Beardsley wants 
us to believe. For clearly, the m eaning  o f the genetic statem ent w ould be p re­
served in the objective one. So are we dealing with a con tinuum  ra th e r than  
a d istinction here?
T h e follow ing observations shou ld  re in fo rce  this im pression. T hus 
re tu rn in g  to the pairs o f  critical term s, we find  that: (i) the sta tem en t »art­
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work x is well-organised« is accepted  as an  objective ju d g e m e n t as opposed  
to »x is skilful« which is condem ned  as genetic, and  (ii) the no tion  o f style 
is accepted  as objective while »technique« is rejected. T he sharp  opposition  
betw een the term s in each andthetica l pair however can be challenged once 
som e additional considerations are in troduced . This is w hat I will try to do 
now.
T hus starting  with the first opposition: B eardsley’s sharp  opposition  
betw een »skilful«, construed  as »being skilfully m ade« and  hence involving 
the end-m eans term inology and  thus ultim ately being a h id d en  ju d g e m e n t 
ab o u t the p ro d u cer ra th e r than  abou t the work, and  »well-organised« as an 
acceptable »purely descriptive« ju d g em en t referring  to the unity o f the work 
is easily challenged  by po in ting  ou t tha t the la tter has equal claims to being  
con stru ed  as »x was organised in a very efficient m anner«  an d  thus involv­
ing  the end-m eans term inology as well. This com es as no  surprise: artw orks 
are created  according to som e principle o f organisation tha t functions as an 
ideal en d  to which various technical rules were em ployed as means. Artworks 
shou ld  be seen as p roducts o f in telligen t action and  this o rganising intelli­
gence shou ld  always be in ferred  from  their form al features.
But even after we discard the claim th a t ‘skilful’ is an  a ttribu te  o f the 
artist ra th e r than  the work, we are still left with an opposition. However, we 
can  draw  an analogy betw een those ju d g em en ts  th a t re fer to the in te rn a l 
o rganisation o f the work and  a class o f judgem en ts tha t attribu te skill on  the 
basis o f  the correc t application  o f technical rules. T hus »well-organised«, a 
structu ra l property, an d  »skilful«, a technical one, can be con stru ed  in  an  
analogous m an n er by reversing an  arg u m en t th a t S tolnitz4 gives in  an  at­
tem p t to subsum e artistic ju d g em en ts u n d e r the b ro ad er genus o f aesthetic 
ones. T h e  arg u m en t draws a link between a ttribu tions o f  skill and  m aking 
decisions and  is useful in this con tex t because decision-m aking is n o t u n re ­
lated  to applying an organisational principle.
Stolnitz’s a rgum ent regards attributions o f  skill applied  to what Stolnitz 
refers to as »the percep tual co n ten t o f  music«, taking as his exam ple the, 
highly conventionalised , we should  note, gen re  o f the sonata. Focusing on 
the  sta tem en t S : »the transition  at the recapitu lation  from  the second sub­
je c t  to the first subject was skilfully made«, Stolnitz unfolds what he  describes 
as S’s »perceptual m eaning«. O m itting  the technicalities, it is en o u g h  to say 
th a t th e re  exist a range o f conventionally  estab lished  alternative ways in 
w hich the transition  can be effected. T hese vary from  scale passages, i.e. 
sim ple acoustic fillers, to ra th e r intriguing harm onic constructions based on
4 J. Stolnitz, »The Artistic Values in Aesthetic Experience«, The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 32 (1979) 5-15.
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the interplay betw een the two them es. Since the transition follows at the end  
o f the developm ent o f the second subject when the first subject re tu rns, we 
are in a position, having listened so far, to antic ipate  the technical problem  
the com poser is going to face. We can th ink  o f the  various alternatives tha t 
are op en  to him . And yet, a technically perfec t solution can  still trigger ou r 
adm ira tion  as well as a reaction o f surprise: this would qualify as a skilful 
solution.
In o th e r words, the tactical move tha t Stolnitz resorts to here  is to place 
the perceiver in the com poser’s position and  enforce u p o n  him  the  prob- 
lem -situation tha t the com poser is confronting . This am ounts, fo r h im , to a 
case o f aesthetic enjoym ent o f the art-m aking activity. T hus listen ing  to the 
work becom es a kind o f com posing it and, we may add, also the o th e r way 
aro u n d , com posing is a kind o f listening. T he distinctness o f the two activi­
ties is b lu rred  as listening em erges as a cognitive exercise we engage in by 
reconstructing  the com poser’s problem .
T he p o in t tha t needs to be m ade however is that this reconstruction  
o ften  has to be far m ore e labo rate  th an  the fill-in-the-gap situation  th a t 
S tolnitz envisages. A nd h ere  I can only refer you to M ichael B axandall ‘s 
excellen t discussion o f the technical problem s tha t Picasso and  B raque en ­
co u n tered  an d  the solutions they provided each o th er w ith.5 T h e  im plica­
tions o f the possibility o f such intricate reconstructions are  far-reaching and 
my tim e-constraints m ake it im possible to unravel them  here. It is however 
enough , for the purposes o f my argum ent, to re ta in  the p o in t th a t by nar­
rowing down the genetic, hence artistic, and  open ing  up  the aesthetic, all 
on  the com m on basis o f a construal tha t would em ploy the idea o f  a recon ­
struction o f the creative process even if this is recast as m erely a  series o f 
choices betw een a range o f alternatives, we see how the aesthetic an d  the 
artistic in te rp e rm eate  each other.
A differen t a rgum ent leading to the same conclusion can be construed  
with respect to the second antithetical pair tha t I singled o u t above, th a t is, 
style and  techn ique . This w ould involve re fo rm ing  the n o tio n  o f  style as 
em ployed by Beardsley by open ing  it up  and  unfo ld ing  its construal in to  a 
discussion o f technique. Beardsley defines style as »the re c u rre n t features 
in  the tex tu re o r  structu re  o f a painting«. This am ounts to a narrow  form al 
defin ition  which reduces style to a statistical m atter o f co u n tin g  repetitive 
patterns. T he theoretical debate on style,1’ however, is organised a ro u n d  two 
m ajor conceptions o f style: (a) style as a m atter o f hum an disposition toward
5 Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures, New Haven: Yale University 
Press 1985.
6 See Berel Lang (ed.), The Concept of Style, Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press 1987.
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ac tion7 an d  (b) style as a m atter o f  choice am ong  constrain ts set by the  his­
tory o f a r t o r by artistic technique.8 W hat bo th  approaches share in com m on 
is the idea tha t som e reference to the artist, e ith e r d irect o r im plicit, can­
n o t be elim inated.
R eform ing, as I p u t it earlier, B eardsley’s concep tion  o f  style w ould 
involve asking how stylistic traits con tribu te  to the w ork’s unity, how they 
function  together. In o th e r words, it would am o u n t to considering  the sty­
listic tra its’ organic function  within the aesthetic object. This w ould involve 
invoking a background  o f alternatives in a way sim ilar to the analysis o f  skil­
ful above. Thus the form alistic defin ition  o f  style w ould unfo ld  itself in to  a 
discussion o f the, unacceptab ly  genetic, accord ing  to Beardsley, n o tio n  o f 
technique.
W hat is now required  is an argum ent in the opposite direction that would 
recast »technique« in term s o f the technical details involved in the p roduc­
tion o f the work and  show how many o f them  directly determ ine o u r percep­
tion. This argum ent is twofold: it involves construing technique as (i) related  
to technical characteristics (the choice o f m aterials), and  (ii) as re ferring  to 
technical rules that were em ployed in the process o f m aking the picture.
T he first part o f the argum ent relies on the idea that certain  m aterials 
are m ore appropriate than  others in rendering  a certain aesthetic effect, thus 
treating  attributions o f aesthetic effect, such as e.g. »delicate« as category-rela- 
tive. N oting that such terms are objective for Beardsley, this possibility leads 
us to the following situation: we have an aesthetic term  that refers to the form  
o f the painting  and  whose paradigm atic use is to be found within a category 
o f paintings that are classified as such by virtue o f the materials em ployed in 
p roducing  them ; thus o u r case am ounts to an objective aesthetic term  whose 
use is partly determ ined  by a non-objective characteristic.
F u rtherm ore , an d  m oving on now to the second leg o f the argum en t, 
co n tra  Beardsley, technical rules may govern o u r percep tion , esp. in  cases 
w here naturalism  withdraws and  the perceptual con ten t o f the work requires 
dec iphering  o f an intensely cognitive character. T he obvious exam ple comes 
from  cubism: a n u m b er o f  cubist devices or, otherw ise, »m odes o f abstrac­
tion« w ere em ployed  with the  specific aim  »to re p re se n t reality  as p e r­
ceived«,9 th a t is from  all perspectives. They involved, for exam ple, the  frag­
7 Cf. Wollheim’s claim thatstyle has psychological reality, see »Pictorial Style: Two Views« 
in Lang (ed.)
8 A definition along these lines is given by Leonard Meyer in »Towards a Theory of 
Style« in Lang (ed.), p. 21.
9 For a very illuminating discussion of this point see Harold Osborne »Cubism, Cezanne 
and Perceptual Realism« in his Abstraction and Artifice in Twentieth Century Art, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1979.
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m entation  o f  objects, the analysis o f  th e ir volum es into various types o f  ab­
stract form s suggestive o f th e ir three-dim ensionality, th e  com bination  o f 
d iffe ren t views o f the same object (in profde, frontally, in  elevation, in sec­
tion) etc. T hese devices, w hich are all m atters o f techn ique , ho ld  the key to 
o u r d ec ip h erin g  the represen ta tional co n ten t o f cubist paintings; in fact, 
artistic factors though  they may be, they d e term in e  o u r co rrec t p ercep tual 
experience o f  the  works. Thus now tha t the g en e tic /a rtistic  a ttrib u tio n  o f 
techn ique has taken us back to the aesth e tic /p e rcep tu a l ex perience o f the 
w ork /aesthe tic  object the inversion o f the categories has been  effected.
T he key tactical moves involved in this whole transition  from  the  aes­
thetic to the artistic an d  back consisted in (a) hypothesising ab o u t the al­
ternative technical solutions open  to the artist an d  (b) reco n stru c tin g  the 
process o f the w ork’s production . T hese strategies lead us to posit the fig­
u re  o f  an ap p a ren t artist, a theoretical construction  having the function  o f 
a unifying princip le. This conclusion w ould be sufficient to  u n d erm in e  the 
w atertight d istinction  betw een the aesthetic and  the artistic as it appears in 
Beardsley although the apparen t artist is n o t a sufficient m ethodological tool 
for the purposes o f a m ore developed philosophy o f art since ap p a ren t p ro ­
cess an d  actual p rod u c tio n  may diverge esp. in cases th a t involve elem ents 
o f forging (e ith er a forged aesthetic effect o r full-scale fo rgeries).10
T he figure o f the ap p a ren t artist is invoked in o rd e r to he lp  illustrate 
the  idea th a t »we see in the work the action o f p roducing  it«.11 In  b o th  kinds 
o f cases m en tioned  above, however, and  perhaps m ore interestingly in  those 
th a t I described  as cases o f  forged  aesthetic effect, such as M o n et’s rap id  
b rushstrokes th a t tu rn  o u t to be carefully  an d  m eticu lously  w orked  o u t 
th ro u g h  thick layers o f u n d erp a in tin g  with ju s t ab o u t zero real spontaneity  
ab o u t them , the ap p a ren t artist is n o t a sufficient m ethodological tool any­
m ore. Such cases show tha t we n eed  to move on  from  the idea o f » apparen t 
process« to th a t o f »reconstructed  real process«. Now the claim  th a t we see 
in the work the action  o f p roduc ing  it is s tretched  to its limits o p era tin g  as 
a constrain t on  o u r reconstructions. In som e cases, this am ounts to the claim 
th a t th ere  is n o th in g  in w hat we see th a t contradicts the reconstruc tion  o f 
the artistic process as this has been  effected with the help  o f  m eans th a t lie 
outside the work: art-historical evidence, for exam ple. Elsewhere, it has the
10 My example of what I refer to as a »forged aesthetic effect« relies on Rosalind Krauss’ 
deconstruction of Monet’s brushstrokes in »The Originality of the Avant-Garde« in 
The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, Cambridge Mass. : M. I. T. 
Press 1994.




less problem atic m ean ing  tha t we discern the artistic action in the w ork af­
te r we have reached  a full account o f that action because the visual evidence 
available was inconclusive.
T hese last rem arks rep resen t a m ajor advance in  o u r discussion so far. 
In  o th e r words, up  to this p o in t my m ain concern  was to refute Beardsley’s 
d ichotom ies simply by showing that the aesthetic and  the g en e tic /a rtis tic  
in te rp erm eate  each other. This was sufficient as far as Beardsley’s app ro ach  
goes b u t it may seem  tha t in do ing  so, I am leaving op en  the possibility o f 
constru ing the aesthetic and  the artistic in term s of the genus-species m odel, 
subsum ing the one u n d e r the other. My ultim ate aim however was to show 
th a t the artistic on its own is fully adequate to cope with the requ irem en ts 
th a t the appreciation  o f a rt poses. Thus by expand ing  the artistic in to  the 
grey area  betw een th a t an d  the  aesthetic, I do  n o t in ten d  to m ake it an  
overarch ing  concep t b u t ra th e r the only concep t th a t is app ro p ria te  in or­
d e r to describe o u r appreciation  o f art.
Having said this, I can now conclude with som e final rem arks p erta in ­
ing  to the  p ro b lem  o f  fo rgeries.T he discussion o f  fo rgeries is c e n te re d  
a ro u n d  the  ra th e r  artificial paradox  o f the o rig inal an d  its percep tually  
indistinguishable fake, a problem  which is often  resolved in a facile m an ­
n e r  by resorting  to the distinction between the aesthetic and  the artistic. It 
is then  argued  tha t such identical paintings would differ in artistic value bu t 
w ould be equal in term s o f aesthetic value.
This kind o f reply has the disadvantage th a t it legitimizes the paradox  
by endorsing  the possibility o f  perceptual indistinguishability between paint­
ings as a genuine possibility. Still, let us resist the tem ptation to con tinue the 
a rg u m en t along the lines o f proving that the whole paradox  o f p ercep tual 
indistinguishability is a non-starter and  let us go along  with it. A ccording to 
som e p ro p o n en ts  o f the distinction, this paradox is dissolved by em ploying 
the  term s o f  the distinction in the following way: the aesthetic is defined  as 
p erta in ing  to the visual qualities o f the p icture, i.e. the »actual« p roperties  
th a t are exem plified by the canvas itself. T he artistic is seen as com pletely 
ex ternal to the work belonging to the dom ain o f criticism o r a rt history. This 
approach , d efended  am ong others by Tomas K ulka,12 is fu rth e r en rich ed  
with a quantitative, school-textbook style m odel o f m easuring the aesthetic 
an d  the artistic value in a work in a scale from  0 to 10, and  with add itional 
links o f  the aesthetic to the pleasing and  the beautiful. A nd it is precisely 
this k ind  o f argum en t th a t led me to claim earlier tha t the term s in which
12 T. Kulka, »The Artistic and the Aesthetic Value of Art«, British Journal of Aesthetics 
21(1981) 336-350 and »The Artistic and Aesthetic Status of Forgeries«, Leonardo 15 
(1982) 115-117.
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Beardsley casts his ob jective/genetic  distinction survive in  the ae s th e tic / 
artistic distinction as it is com m only used. For w hat are reg ard ed  as art-his- 
torical factors, such as originality o r authenticity, are seen as so ex terna l to 
the work that they en d  up  in the sam e league as the artist’s biography. O nce 
again we have to p u t up  with the in te rn a l/ex te rn a l dichotom y.
T he conclusion I draw from  all the above can be sum m arised as follows: 
there  is a genu ine  distinction betw een the concep t o f the aesthetic an d  th a t 
o f the artistic b u t their respective dom ains o f application are very d iffe ren t 
from  w hat they are usually taken to be, tha t is, the distinction can be m ade 
o u t with precision only if the aesthetic is to be excluded from  the  dom ain  
o f a rt.13 It is o f course possible, despite this, to insist that an  original artw ork 
and  an identical looking fake have equal aesthetic value b u t we w ould only 
be able to secure tha t a t a very heavy price: n e ith e r o f them  w ould th en  be 
seen as a work o f art. Such an im plication runs contrary  to the w hole spirit 
o f  attributions o f aesthetic value. A nd even if it appears as appealing  to those 
who are inclined n o t to regard  fakes as art, it has the disastrous consequence 
tha t the fake »takes down with it«, so to speak, the original artw ork as well. 
This way we en d  up  with an artw ork tha t is regarded  as non-art, i.e. as a m ere 
percep tual su rface .14
13 For a similar conclusion arising out of different concerns see McFee, op. cit. My 
concerns in following McFee’s radical line are much narrower, i. e. seeing the artistic 
in terms of the technical and the institutional.
14 I would like to thank Graham McFee for useful discussions on a number of occasions 
as well as for allowing me to see his unpublished work on the artistic and the aesthetic.

